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Enabling Multi-level Trust in Privacy
Preserving Data Mining
Yaping Li, Minghua Chen, Qiwei Li and Wei Zhang
Abstract—Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) addresses the problem of developing accurate models about aggregated
data without access to precise information in individual data record. A widely studied perturbation-based PPDM approach
introduces random perturbation to individual values to preserve privacy before data is published. Previous solutions of this
approach are limited in their tacit assumption of single-level trust on data miners.
In this work, we relax this assumption and expand the scope of perturbation-based PPDM to Multi-Level Trust (MLT-PPDM). In
our setting, the more trusted a data miner is, the less perturbed copy of the data it can access. Under this setting, a malicious data
miner may have access to differently perturbed copies of the same data through various means, and may combine these diverse
copies to jointly infer additional information about the original data that the data owner does not intend to release. Preventing
such diversity attacks is the key challenge of providing MLT-PPDM services. We address this challenge by properly correlating
perturbation across copies at different trust levels. We prove that our solution is robust against diversity attacks with respect to
our privacy goal. That is, for data miners who have access to an arbitrary collection of the perturbed copies, our solution prevent
them from jointly reconstructing the original data more accurately than the best effort using any individual copy in the collection.
Our solution allows a data owner to generate perturbed copies of its data for arbitrary trust levels on-demand. This feature offers
data owners maximum flexibility.
Index Terms—Privacy preserving data mining, multi-level trust, random perturbation
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Data perturbation, a widely employed and accepted
Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) approach,
tacitly assumes single-level trust on data miners. This
approach introduces uncertainty about individual val-
ues before data is published or released to third
parties for data mining purposes [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7]. Under the single trust level assumption, a data
owner generates only one perturbed copy of its data
with a fixed amount of uncertainty. This assumption
is limited in various applications where a data owner
trusts the data miners at different levels.
We present below a two trust level scenario as a
motivating example.
• The government or a business might do internal
(most trusted) data mining, but they may also
want to release the data to the public, and might
perturb it more. The mining department which
receives the less perturbed internal copy also
has access to the more perturbed public copy. It
would be desirable that this department does not
have more power in reconstructing the original
data by utilizing both copies than when it has
only the internal copy.
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• Conversely, if the internal copy is leaked to the
public, then obviously the public has all the
power of the mining department. However, it
would be desirable if the public cannot recon-
struct the original data more accurately when it
uses both copies than when it uses only the
leaked internal copy.
This new dimension of Multi-Level Trust (MLT)
poses new challenges for perturbation based PPDM.
In contrast to the single-level trust scenario where
only one perturbed copy is released, now multiple
differently perturbed copies of the same data is avail-
able to data miners at different trusted levels. The
more trusted a data miner is, the less perturbed copy
it can access; it may also have access to the perturbed
copies available at lower trust levels. Moreover, a
data miner could access multiple perturbed copies
through various other means, e.g., accidental leakage
or colluding with others.
By utilizing diversity across differently perturbed
copies, the data miner may be able to produce a more
accurate reconstruction of the original data than what
is allowed by the data owner. We refer to this attack
as a diversity attack. It includes the colluding attack
scenario where adversaries combine their copies to
mount an attack; it also includes the scenario where
an adversary utilizes public information to perform
the attack on its own. Preventing diversity attacks is
the key challenge in solving the MLT-PPDM problem.
In this paper, we address this challenge in enabling
MLT-PPDM services. In particular, we focus on the ad-
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ditive perturbation approach where random Gaussian
noise is added to the original data with arbitrary dis-
tribution, and provide a systematic solution. Through
a one-to-one mapping, our solution allows a data
owner to generate distinctly perturbed copies of its
data according to different trust levels. Defining trust
levels and determining such mappings are beyond the
scope of this paper.
1.1 Contributions
We make the following contributions:
• We expand the scope of perturbation based
PPDM to multi-level trust, by relaxing the im-
plicit assumption of single-level trust in existing
work. MLT-PPDM introduces another dimension
of flexibility which allows data owners to gen-
erate differently perturbed copies of its data for
different trust levels.
• We identify a key challenge in enabling MLT-
PPDM services. In MLT-PPDM, data miners may
have access to multiple perturbed copies. By
combining multiple perturbed copies, data min-
ers may be able to perform diversity attacks to
reconstruct the original data more accurately than
what is allowed by the data owner. Defending
such attacks is challenging, which we explain
through a case study in Section 4.
• We address this challenge by properly correlating
perturbation across copies at different trust levels.
We prove that our solution is robust against di-
versity attacks. We propose several algorithms for
different targeting scenarios. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of our solution through experiments
on real data.
• Our solution allows data owners to generate per-
turbed copies of their data at arbitrary trust levels
on-demand. This property offers data owners
maximum flexibility.
1.2 Related Work
Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) was first
proposed in [2] and [8] simultaneously. To address
this problem, researchers have since proposed various
solutions that fall into two broad categories based on
the level of privacy protection they provide. The first
category of the Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)
approach provides the strongest level of privacy; it
enables mutually distrustful entities to mine their
collective data without revealing anything except for
what can be inferred from an entity’s own input and
the output of the mining operation alone [8], [9].
In principle, any data mining algorithm can be im-
plemented by using generic algorithms of SMC [10].
However, these algorithms are extraordinarily expen-
sive in practice, and impractical for real use. To avoid
the high computational cost, various solutions that
are more efficient than generic SMC algorithms have
been proposed for specific mining tasks. Solutions to
build decision trees over the horizontally partitioned
data were proposed in [8] . For vertically partitioned
data, algorithms have been proposed to address the
association rule mining [9], k-means clustering [11],
and frequent pattern mining problems [12]. The work
of [13] uses a secure coprocessor for privacy preserv-
ing collaborative data mining and analysis.
The second category of the partial information hid-
ing approach trades privacy with improved perfor-
mance in the sense that malicious data miners may
infer certain properties of the original data from the
disguised data. Various solutions in this category
allow a data owner to transform its data in different
ways to hide the true values of the original data
while at the same time still permit useful mining
operations over the modified data. This approach
can be further divided into three categories: (a) k-
anonymity [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], (b) retention
replacement (which retains an element with proba-
bility p or replaces it with an element selected from
a probability distribution function on the domain of
the elements) [20], [21], [22], and (c) data perturba-
tion (which introduces uncertainty about individual
values before data is published) [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7], [23].
The data perturbation approach includes two main
classes of methods: additive [1], [2], [4], [5], [7] and
matrix multiplicative [3], [6] schemes. These methods
apply mainly to continuous data. In this paper, we
focus solely on the additive perturbation approach
where noise is added to data values.
Another relevant line of research concerns the
problem of privately computing various set related
operations. Two party protocols for intersection, in-
tersection size, equijoin, and equijoin size were in-
troduced in [24] for honest-but-curious adversarial
model. Some of the proposed protocols leak informa-
tion [25]. Similar protocols for set intersection have
been proposed in [26], [27]. Efficient two party pro-
tocols for the private matching problem which are
both secure in the malicious and honest-but-curious
models were introduced in [28]. Efficient private and
threshold set intersection protocols were proposed
in [29]. While most of these protocols are equality
based, algorithms in [25] compute arbitrary join pred-
icates leveraging the power of a secure coprocessor.
Tiny trusted devices were used for secure function
evaluation in [30].
Our work does not re-anonymizing a dataset after
it is updated with insertions and/or deletions, which
is a topic studied by the authors in [31], [32], [33],
[34]. Instead, we study anonymizing the same dataset
at multiple trust levels. The two problems are orthog-
onal.
An earlier version of this paper appeared in [35] and
initiated the topic of MLT-PPDM. Recently, Xiao et al.
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proposed an algorithm of multi-level uniform pertur-
bation [36]. Our paper differs from [36] in three main
aspects. Firstly, the two papers address different prob-
lems and tackle the problems under different privacy
measures. We propose multi-level privacy preserving
for additive Gaussian noise perturbation, and use a
measure based on how closely the original values
can be reconstructed from the perturbed data [2], [4],
[5]. While [36] presents an algorithm of multi-level
uniform perturbation, and studies its performance
using the ρ1 − ρ2 privacy measure [37]. As a result,
neither the solution in [36] can be easily applied to
the problem in this paper nor the solution in this
paper can be directly applied to the problem in [36].
Secondly, based on Gaussian noise perturbation, the
solution in this paper is more suitable for high-
dimensional data, as compared to that in [36] based on
uniform perturbation [38]. Thirdly, We present several
nontrivial theoretical results. We discuss reconstruc-
tion errors under independence noise, analyze the se-
curity of our scheme when collusion occurs, and study
the computational complexities based on Kroneckor
product. These results provide fundamental insights
into the problem.
1.3 Paper Layout
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
go over preliminaries in Section 2. We formulate the
problem, and define our privacy goal in Section 3.
In Section 4, we present a simple but important case
study. It highlights the key challenge in achieving our
privacy goal, and presents the intuition that leads
to our solution. In Section 5, we formally present
our solution, and prove that it achieves our privacy
goal. Algorithms that target different scenarios are
also proposed, and their complexities are studied.
We carry out extensive experiments on real data in
Section 6 to verify our theoretical analysis. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Jointly Gaussian
In this paper, we focus on perturbing data by additive
Gaussian noise [1], [2], [4], [5], [7], i.e., the added
noises are jointly Gaussian.1
Let G1 through GL be L Gaussian random vari-
ables. They are said to be jointly Gaussian if and only
if each of them is a linear combination of multiple in-
1. Note that we do not make any assumptions about the distri-
bution of the data.
dependent Gaussian random variables.2 Equivalently,
G1 through GL are jointly Gaussian if and only if any
linear combination of them is also a Gaussian random
variable.
A vector formed by jointly Gaussian random vari-
ables is called a jointly Gaussian vector. For a jointly
Gaussian vector G = [G1, . . . , GL]
T , its probability
density function (PDF) is as follows: for any real
vector g,
fG(g) =
1√
(2pi)L det(KG)
e−(g−µG)
TK−1
G
(g−µG)/2,
where µG and KG are the mean vector and covariance
matrix of G, respectively.
Note that not all Gaussian random variables are
jointly Gaussian. For example, let G1 be a zero mean
Gaussian random variable with a positive variance,
and define G2 as
G2 =
{
G1, if |G1| ≤ 1;
−G1, otherwise.
where |G1| is the absolute value of G1. It is straight-
forward to verify that G2 is Gaussian, but G1 +G2 is
not. Therefore, G1 and G2 are not jointly Gaussian.
If multiple random variables are jointly Gaussian,
then conditional on a subset of them, the remaining
variables are still jointly Gaussian. Specifically, parti-
tion a jointly Gaussian vector G as
G =
[
G1
G2
]
and
µG =
[
µ1
µ2
]
, KG =
[
K11 K12
K21 K22
]
accordingly. Then the distribution of G2 given G1 = v1
is also a jointly Gaussian with mean µ2+K21K
−1
11 (v1−
µ1) and covariance matrix K22 − K21K
−1
11 K
T
21 [39,
ch 2.5]. This is a key property of jointly Gaussian
variables. We utilize this property in Section 5.3.
2.2 Additive Perturbation
The single-level trust PPDM problem via data pertur-
bation has been widely studied in literature. In this
setting, a data owner implicitly trusts all recipients of
its data uniformly and distributes a single perturbed
copy of the data.
A widely used and accepted way to perturb data
is by additive perturbation [1], [2], [4], [5], [7]. This
2. Two random variables are independent if knowing the value
of one yields no knowledge about that of the other. Mathemat-
ically, two random variables G1 and G2 are independent if, for
any values g1 and g2, fG1,G2 (g1, g2) = fG1 (g1)fG2 (g2), where
fG1,G2 (g1, g2) is the joint probability density function of G1 and
G2, and fG1 (g1) and fG2 (g2) are the probability density functions
ofG1 andG2, respectively. Generally, random variablesG1 through
GL are mutually independent if, for any values g1 through gL,
fG1,...,GL (g1, ..., gL) = fG1 (g1)...fGL (gL).
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approach adds to the original data, X , some random
noise, Z , to obtain the perturbed copy, Y , as follows:
Y = X + Z. (1)
We assume that X , Y , and Z are all N -dimension
vectors where N is the number of attributes in X .
Let xj , yj , and zj be the j
th entry of X , Y , and Z
respectively.
The original data X follows a distribution with
mean vector µX and covariance matrix KX . The co-
variance KX is an N×N positive semi-definite matrix
given by
KX = E
[
(X − µX)(X − µX)
T
]
, (2)
which is a diagonal matrix if the attributes in X are
uncorrelated.
The noise Z is assumed to be independent of X
and is a jointly Gaussian vector with zero mean and
covariance matrix KZ chosen by the data owner. In
short, we write it as Z ∼ N(0,KZ). The covariance
matrix KZ is an N ×N positive semi-definite matrix
given by
KZ = E
[
ZZT
]
. (3)
It is straightforward to verify the mean vector of Y
is also µX , and its covariance matrix, denoted by KY ,
is
KY = KX +KZ .
The perturbed copy Y is published or released to
data miners. Equation 1 models both the cases where
a data miner sees a perturbed copy of X , and where it
knows the true values of certain attributes. The latter
scenario is considered in recent work [7] where the
authors show that sophisticated filtering techniques
utilizing the true value leaks can help recover X .
In general, given Y , a malicious data miner’s goal
is to reconstruct X by filtering out the added noise.
The authors of [4] point out that the attributes in X
and the added noise should have the same correlation,
otherwise the noise can be easily filtered out. This
observation essentially requires to choose KZ to be
proportional to KX [4], i.e., KZ = σ
2
ZKX for some
constant σ2Z denoting the perturbation magnitude.
2.3 Linear Least Squares Error Estimation
Given a perturbed copy of the data, a malicious data
miner may attempt to reconstruct the original data
as accurately as possible. Among the family of linear
reconstruction methods, where estimates can only be
linear functions of the perturbed copy, Linear Least
Squares Error (LLSE) estimation has the minimum
square errors between the estimated values and the
original values [39, ch 7.1–7.2].
The LLSE estimate of X given Y , denoted by Xˆ(Y ),
is (see Appendix A for the deduction)
Xˆ(Y ) = KXYK
−1
Y (Y − µX) + µX , (4)
where KXY (KY resp.) is the covariance matrix of X
and Y (Y resp.). KXY is given by
KXY = E[(X − µX)(Y − E[Y ])
T ]
= E[(X − µX)((X − µX) + (Z − 0))
T ]
= KX + 0 = KX .
Note in the above derivation, we compute E[(X −
µX)Z
T ] = E[(X − µX)]E[Z
T ] = 0, since X and Z are
independent.
The square estimation errors between the LLSE
estimates and the original values of the attributes in
X are the diagonal terms of the covariance matrix of
X− Xˆ(Y ). An important property of LLSE estimation
is that it simultaneously minimizes all these estima-
tion errors.
2.4 Kronecker Product
In the MLT-PPDM problem, the covariance matrix of
noises can be written as the Kronecker product [40] of
two matrices. In this paper, we explore the properties
of the Kronecker product for efficient computation.
The Kronecker product [40] is a binary matrix oper-
ator that maps two matrices of arbitrary dimensions
into a larger matrix with a special block structure.
Given an n×m matrix A and p× q matrix B, where
A =


a11 · · · a1m
...
. . .
...
an1 · · · anm

 ,
their Kronecker product, denoted as A⊗B, is an np×
mq matrix with the block structure

a11B · · · a1mB
...
. . .
...
an1B · · · anmB

 .
We list several properties of Kronecker product that
will be used later. Assume that A, B, C and D are
matrices and their dimensions are appropriate for the
computation in each property, we have
1) (αA)⊗B = A⊗ (αB) = α(A⊗B), where α ∈ R;
2) (A⊗B)T = AT ⊗BT ;
3) (A⊗B)−1 = A−1 ⊗B−1;
4) (A⊗B)(C ⊗D) = AC ⊗BD;
5) vec(ABC) = (CT ⊗ A)vec(B), where vec(·) de-
notes the vectorization of a matrix formed by
stacking the columns of the matrix into a single
column vector.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present the problem settings, de-
scribe our threat model, state our privacy goal, and
identify the design space. Table 1 lists the key nota-
tions used in the paper.
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TABLE 1
Key Notations
Notation Definition
X original data
Yi perturbed copy of X of trust level i
Zi noise added to X to generate Yi
M number of trust levels
N number of attributes in X
Y a vector of all M perturbed copies
Z a vector of noise Z1 to ZM
Xˆ(Y) LLSE estimate of X given Y
KX covariance matrix of X
KZ covariance matrix of Z
3.1 Problem Settings
In the MLT-PPDM problem we consider in this paper,
a data owner trusts data miners at different levels and
generates a series of perturbed copies of its data for
different trust levels. This is done by adding varying
amount of noise to the data.
Under the multi-level trust setting, data miners at
higher trust levels can access less perturbed copies.
Such less perturbed copies are not accessible by data
miners at lower trust levels. In some scenarios, such
as the motivating example we give at the beginning
of Section 1, data miners at higher trust levels may
also have access to the perturbed copies at more than
one trust levels. Data miners at different trust levels
may also collude to share the perturbed copies among
them. As such, it is common that data miners can have
access to more than one perturbed copies.
Specifically, we assume that the data owner wants
to release M perturbed copies of its data X , which is
an N × 1 vector with mean µX and covariance KX as
defined in Section 2.2. These M copies can be gener-
ated in various fashions. They can be jointly generated
all at once. Alternatively, they can be generated at
different times upon receiving new requests from data
miners, in an on-demand fashion. The latter case gives
data owners maximum flexibility.
It is true that the data owner may consider to release
only the mean and covariance of the original data. We
remark that simply releasing the mean and covariance
does not provide the same utility as the perturbed
data. For many real applications, knowing only the
mean and covariance may not be sufficient to apply
data mining techniques, such as clustering, principal
component analysis, and classification [6]. By using
random perturbation to release the dataset, the data
owner allows the data miner to exploit more statisti-
cal information without releasing the exact values of
sensitive attributes [1], [2].
Let Y = [Y T1 , . . . , Y
T
M ]
T be the vector of all perturbed
copies Yi(1 ≤ i ≤ M). Let Z = [Z
T
1 , . . . , Z
T
M ]
T be the
vector of noise. Let H be an (N ·M) × N matrix as
follows:
H =


IN
...
IN

 ,
where IN represents an N ×N identity matrix.
We have the relationship between Y, X and Z as
follows:
Y =


Y1
...
YM

 =


IN
...
IN

X+


Z1
...
ZM

 = HX+Z, (5)
where Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M are independent of X . To be
robust against advanced filtering attacks, individual
noise terms in Zi added to different attributes in X
should have the same correlations as the attributes
themselves, otherwise Zi can be easily filtered out [4].
As such, we have
KZi = σ
2
ZiKX , and KYi = (1 + σ
2
Zi)KX ,
where σ2Zi is a constant of the perturbation magnitude.
The data owner chooses a value for σ2Zi according to
the trust level associated with the target perturbed
copy Yi.
3.2 Threat Model
We assume malicious data miners who always at-
tempt to reconstruct a more accurate estimate of the
original data given perturbed copies. We hence use
the terms data miners and adversaries interchange-
ably throughout this paper. In MLT-PPDM, adver-
saries may have access to a subset of the perturbed
copies of the data. The adversaries’ goal is to recon-
struct the original data as accurately as possible based
on all available perturbed copies.
The reconstruction accuracy depends heavily on
the adversaries’ knowledge. We make the same as-
sumption as the one in [4] that adversaries have the
knowledge of the statistics of the original data X and
the noise Z, i.e., mean µX , and covariance matrices
KX andKZ. Note the adversaries with less knowledge
are weaker than the ones we study in this paper.
In addition, we assume adversaries only perform
linear estimation attacks, where estimates can only be
linear functions of the perturbed data Y . It is known
that if X follows a jointly Gaussian distribution, then
LLSE estimation achieves the minimum estimation
error among both linear and nonlinear estimation
methods. For X with general distribution, LLSE es-
timation has the minimum estimation error among
all linear estimation methods. Various recent work in
perturbation based PPDM, such as [4] and [5], makes
this assumption of linear estimation. See reference [7]
for a comprehensive review.
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Noticed KXY = KXH
T and KY = HKXH
T +KZ,
the LLSE estimate Xˆ(Y) of X given Y can be ex-
pressed as:
Xˆ(Y) = KXYK
−1
Y
(Y− E[Y]) + µX
= KXH
T
[
HKXH
T +KZ
]−1
(Y−HµX)
+µX . (6)
In our setting, Xˆ(Y) is the most accurate estimate of
X that an adversary can possibly make. The corre-
sponding estimation errors of attributes in X are the
diagonal terms of the covariance matrix of Xˆ(Y)−X .
Using Equation 6, we can compute the covariance
matrix as follows:
E
[(
Xˆ(Y)−X
)(
Xˆ(Y)−X
)T]
= KX −KXH
TK−1
Y
HKX =
[
K−1X +H
TK−1
Z
H
]−1
. (7)
For an adversary who observes only a single copy
Yi (1 ≤ i ≤ M) and gets a LLSE estimate Xˆ(Yi), the
covariance matrix of Xˆ(Yi)−X has a simple form as
follows:
E
[(
Xˆ(Yi)−X
)(
Xˆ(Yi)−X
)T]
= KX −KXK
−1
Yi
KX =
σ2Zi
σ2Zi + 1
KX . (8)
3.3 Definitions
3.3.1 Distortion
To facilitate future discussion on privacy, we define
the concept of perturbation D between two datasets as
the average expected square difference between them.
For example, the distortion between the original data
X and the perturbed copy Y as defined in Section 2.2
is given by:
D(X,Y ) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
E[(yj − xj)
2] ≥ 0.
It is easy to see that D(X,Y ) = D(Y,X).
Based on the above definition, we refer to a per-
turbed copy Y2 to be more perturbed than Y1 with
respect to X if and only if D(X,Y2) > D(X,Y1).
3.3.2 Privacy under Single-level Trust Setting
With respect to the original data X , the privacy of a
perturbed copy Y represents how well the true values
of X is hidden in Y .
A more perturbed copy of the data does not nec-
essarily have more privacy since the added noise
may be intelligently filtered out. Consequently, we
define the privacy of a perturbed copy by taking into
account an adversary’s power in reconstructing the
original data. We define the privacy of Y with respect
to X to be D(X, Xˆ(Y )), i.e., the distortion between
X and the LLSE estimate Xˆ(Y ). A larger distortion
hides the original values better (and thus preserves
more privacy), so we refer to a perturbed data Y2 to
preserve more privacy than Y1 with respect to X if and
only if D(X, Xˆ(Y2)) > D(X, Xˆ(Y1)).
3.3.3 Privacy under Multi-level Trust Setting
We now define privacy for the multi-level trust case
in the same spirit of the single-level trust case.
For a vector Y = [Y T1 , · · · , Y
T
M ]
T of M perturbed
copies of X , the privacy of Y represents how well the
true values of X is hidden in the multiple perturbed
copies Y. The privacy of Y, with respect to X , is
defined as D(X, Xˆ(Y)), the distortion between X and
its LLSE estimate Xˆ(Y).
3.4 Privacy Goal and Design Space
In a MLT-PPDM setting, a data owner releases dis-
tinctly perturbed copies of its data to multiple data
miners. One key goal of the data owner is to control
the amount of information about its data that adver-
saries may derive.
We assume that the data owner wants to distribute
a total of M different perturbed copies of its data, i.e.,
Yi(1 ≤ i ≤M), each for a trust level i. The assumption
of M is for ease of analysis. It will become clear later
that our solution of the on-demand generation allows
a data owner to generate as many different copies as
it wishes.
The data owner can easily control the amount of
the information about its data an attacker may infer
from a single perturbed copy. Utilizing Equation 8, we
express the privacy of Yi, i.e., D(X, Xˆ(Yi)), as follows:
D(X, Xˆ(Yi))
=
1
N
Tr
(
E
[(
Xˆ(Yi)−X
)(
Xˆ(Yi)−X
)T])
=
σ2Zi
σ2Zi + 1
1
N
Tr (KX) , (9)
where Tr(·) represents the trace of a matrix.
The data owner can easily control the privacy of an
individual copy Yi by setting σ
2
Zi
according to trust
level i through a one-to-one mapping. Defining trust
levels and such mappings are beyond the scope of this
paper.
However, such control alone is not sufficient in the
face of diversity attacks. Adversaries that can access
copies at different trust levels enjoy the diversity
gain when they combine multiple distinctly perturbed
copies to estimate the original data. We discuss one
such case in Section 4.2.1.
Ideally, the amount of information about X that
adversaries can jointly infer from multiple perturbed
copies should be no more than that of the best effort
using any individual copy.
Formally, we say the privacy goal is achieved with
respect to M perturbed copies Yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M , if the
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following statement holds. For an arbitrary subset YC
of {Yi, 1 ≤ i ≤M},
D(X, Xˆ(YC)) = min
ξ∈YC
D(X, Xˆ(ξ)). (10)
where YC is the set of perturbed copies an adversary
uses to reconstruct the original data.
Intuitively, achieving the privacy goal requires that
given the copy with the least privacy among any
subset of these M perturbed copies, the remaining
copies in that subset contain no extra information
about X .
To achieve this goal, the available design space is
noise Z. We already determine that individual noise
Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M must follow N(0, σ
2
Zi
KX). In the
rest of the paper, we show by properly correlating
noise Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M , the desired privacy goal can be
achieved.
4 CASE STUDY
In this section, we study a basic case corresponding to
the motivating example we described at the beginning
of Section 1. In the case, a data miner has access to two
differently perturbed copies of the same data, each for
a different trust level. We present the challenges in
achieving the privacy goal in Equation 10 with two
false starts. As we develop a solution to this basic
base, we show the key ideas in solving the more
general case of arbitrarily fine granularity of trust
levels.
4.1 An Illustrative Case
For ease of illustration, we assume single attribute
data. We assume that the data owner has already
distributed a perturbed copy Y2 of the original data
X where
Y2 = X + Z2.
Denote the variance of X as σ2X , and the Gaussian
noise Z2 ∼ N(0, σ
2
2σ
2
X) is independent of X .
The data owner now wishes to produce another
perturbed copy Y1. It generates Gaussian noise Z1 ∼
N(0, σ21σ
2
X), and adds it to X to obtain Y1 as
Y1 = X + Z1.
The new noise Z1 is also independent of X (but could
be designed to be correlated with Z2). We consider the
case where the data owner chooses σ22 > σ
2
1 so that
Y1 is less perturbed than Y2.
The privacy goal in Equation 10 requires that
D(X, Xˆ(Y1, Y2)) = D(X, Xˆ(Y1)). (11)
To see this, note that min(D(X, Xˆ(Y1)),D(X, Xˆ(Y2)))
can be simplified to D(X, Xˆ(Y1)), i.e., the less per-
turbed copy gives better estimate.
4.2 Two False Starts
In this section, we illustrate the challenges in achiev-
ing the privacy goal with two false starts.
4.2.1 Independent Noise
The first intuitive attempt is to generate the two
perturbed copies independently. The added noise in
the two perturbed copies is not only independent to
the original data, but also independent to each other.
In the case we consider, the above solution gener-
ates Z1 to be independent of X and Z2 respectively.
Consequently, adversaries have two perturbed copies
as follows: {
Y1 = X + Z1
Y2 = X + Z2
where X , Z1 and Z2 are mutually independent. The
adversaries perform a joint LLSE estimation to ob-
tain Xˆ(Y1, Y2). Straightforward computation utilizing
Equation 7 shows that
D(X, Xˆ(Y1, Y2)) =
σ2X
1 + 1/σ21 + 1/σ
2
2
.
This value is strictly smaller than the error of the
estimate based on either Y1 or Y2, which is for i = 1, 2,
D(X, Xˆ(Yi)) =
σ2X
1 + 1/σ2i
,
following Equation 8. Thus, Equation 11 is not satis-
fied and the desired privacy goal is not achieved.
Example. Assume that the original dataset has sin-
gle attribute data X with mean µX = 10 and variance
σ2X = 1. The data owner releases perturbed copies
Y1 = X + Z1 and Y2 = X + Z2 of two (sensitive)
values X = [9, 11]T to Alice and Bob with different
trust levels σ21 = 1 and σ
2
2 = 4, respectively.
Alice reconstructs the data values using Eqn. (4),
and obtains Xˆ(Y1) = [9.5, 10.5]
T + 0.5Z1. The average
estimation error is
1
2
E[(Xˆ −X)T (Xˆ −X)] = 0.125E[ZT1 Z1] + 0.25 = 0.5.
Bob reconstructs the data values using Eqn. (4),
and obtains Xˆ(Y1) = [9.8, 10.2]
T + 0.2Z2. The average
estimation error is
1
2
E[(Xˆ −X)T (Xˆ −X)] = 0.02E[ZT2 Z2] + 0.64 = 0.8.
Assume that Y1 and Y2 are generated indepen-
dently. The reconstructed data after the collusion
between Alice and Bob using Eqn. (6) are Xˆ(Y) =
[85, 95]T/9 + 4Z1/9 + Z2/9. The average estimation
error is
1
2
E[(Xˆ−X)T (Xˆ−X)] =
8
81
ZT1 Z1+
1
162
ZT2 Z2+
16
81
=
4
9
.
Thus the collusion results in a smaller error. ✷
Intuitively, this is because the two copies of the data
are generated independently, each containing some
innovative information of the original data that is
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absent from the other. When estimation is performed
jointly, the innovative information from both copies
can be utilized, resulting in a smaller estimation error
and thus a more accurate estimate.
4.2.2 Linearly Dependent Noise
In light of the incorrectness of the first solution, one
might consider a second approach to generate new
noise so that it is linearly dependent to the existing
one.
In the case we consider, the above approach may
generate Z1 =
σ1
σ2
Z2. It is easy to verify that Z1 ∼
N(0, σ21σ
2
X). However, Y1 = X + Z1 again fails to
achieve the privacy goal.
To see this, notice that the adversaries who have
access to both copies can reconstruct X perfectly as
follows:
X =
σ2Y1 − σ1Y2
σ2 − σ1
=
σ2(X + Z1)− σ1(X + Z2)
σ2 − σ1
.
The estimation error is zero, and Equation 11 is not
satisfied.
4.3 Proposed Solution
Intuitively, Equation 11 requires that given Y1, ob-
serving the more perturbed Y2 does not improve the
estimation accuracy.
One way to satisfy Equation 11 is to generate Z1 so
that Y1 = X+Z1 and Z2−Z1 are independent. To see
why, we rewrite Y2 as
Y2 = Y1 + (Z2 − Z1). (12)
If Y1 and Z2−Z1 are independent, then Y2 is nothing
but a perturbed observation of Y1. All information in
Y2 useful for estimating X is inherited from Y1. Con-
sequently, given Y1, Y2 provides no extra innovative
information to improve the estimation accuracy, and
Equation 11 is satisfied.
Since X and Z1 (resp. Z2) are independent, Y1
and Z2 − Z1 are independent if Z1 and Z2 − Z1 are
independent. The following theorem gives a sufficient
and necessary condition for Z1 and Z2 to satisfy that
Z1 and Z2 − Z1 are independent.
Theorem 1: Assume Z1 ∼ N(0, σ
2
1σ
2
X), Z2 ∼
N(0, σ22σ
2
X), and σ
2
1 < σ
2
2 . Z1 and Z2 − Z1 are inde-
pendent if and only if Z1 and Z2 are jointly Gaussian
and their covariance matrix is[
σ21σ
2
X σ
2
1σ
2
X
σ21σ
2
X σ
2
2σ
2
X
]
. (13)
Proof: Refer to Appendix B.
The following theorem states that Z1 and Z2 − Z1
being independent is a sufficient condition for Equa-
tion 11 to hold.
Theorem 2: Given that Z1 ∼ N(0, σ
2
1σ
2
X) and Z2 ∼
N(0, σ22σ
2
X), and σ
2
1 < σ
2
2 , if Z1 and Z2 − Z1 are
independent, then Equation 11 holds.
Proof: Refer to Appendix C.
Example. We now revisit the example in Sec-
tion 4.2.1 to show that collusion does not improve es-
timation accuracy in our scheme. Assume that Y1 and
Y2 are generated following the proposed solution, i.e.,
Z1 and Z2 are jointly Gaussian and their covariance
matrix is
[
1 1
1 4
]
. The reconstructed data after the
collusion between Alice and Bob using Eqn. (6) are
Xˆ(Y1) = [9.5, 10.5]
T + 0.5Z1. The average estimation
error is
1
2
E[(Xˆ −X)T (Xˆ −X)] = 0.125E[ZT1 Z1] + 0.25 = 0.5.
This error of joint estimation is the same as the error of
estimation using only the least perturbed copy. Thus
the collusion does not result in a smaller error in our
scheme. ✷
Remark: Intuitively, since Y2 is a perturbed ob-
servation of Y1 as shown in Equation 12, Y2 cannot
provide extra innovative information to improve the
estimation accuracy achieved by utilizing only Y1, and
Equation 11 is satisfied.
This sufficient condition is key in achieving the
privacy goal in this simple case, as well as in the
general cases, on which we elaborate in Section 5.
Following the above analysis, our solution to this
simple case is as follows:
• Given σ21 and σ
2
2 , construct the covariance matrix
of Z1 and Z2 as in Equation 13. Derive the joint
distribution of Z1 and Z2.
• Compute the conditional distribution of Z1 given
Z2. Generate Z1 according to this conditional
distribution.
• Generate the desired Y1 = X + Z1.
In this way, Z1 and Z2 − Z1 are guaranteed to be
independent; hence, Equation 11 is satisfied.
5 SOLUTION TO GENERAL CASES
We now show that the solutions to the general cases
of arbitrarily fine trust levels follow naturally from
that to the two trust level case studied in Section 4.
5.1 Shaping the Noise
5.1.1 Independent Noise Revisited
In Section 4, we show that adding independent noise
to generate two differently perturbed copies, although
convenient, fails to achieve our privacy goal. The
increase in the number of independently generated
copies aggravates the situation; the estimation error
actually goes to zero as this number increases indefi-
nitely. In turn, the attackers can perfectly reconstruct
the original data. We formalize this observation in the
following theorem.
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Theorem 3: Let Y = [Y T1 , . . . , Y
T
M ]
T be a vector
containing M perturbed copies. Assume that Y is
generated from the original data X as follows:
Y = HX + Z,
where H = [IN , . . . , IN ]
T
, and Z = [ZT1 , . . . , Z
T
M ]
T
with Zi ∼ N(0, σ
2
Zi
KX) is the noise vector.
If noise Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M are mutually independent,
then the square errors between the LLSE estimate X
and Xˆ(Y) are the diagonal terms of the following
matrix (
1 +
M∑
i=1
1
σ2Zi
)−1
KX .
As M increases, the estimation errors decrease, so
does the distortion D(X, Xˆ(Y)).
Proof: Refer to Appendix D.
Remark: The theorem says that when adding a
new copy that is perturbed by independent noise, the
estimation error decreases. It agrees with the intuition
that a new independently-perturbed copy adds extra
innovative information to improve the estimation ac-
curacy.
We conclude that noise Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M should not
be generated independently.
5.1.2 Properly Correlated Noise
We show by the case study that the key to achieving
the desired privacy goal is to have noise Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤M
properly correlated. To this end, we further develop
the pattern found in the 2 × 2 noise covariance
matrix in Equation 13 into a corner-wave property
for a multi-dimensional noise covariance matrix.
This property becomes the cornerstone of Theorem 4
which is a generalization of Theorem 1 and 2.
Corner-wave Property Theorem 4 states that for M
perturbed copies, the privacy goal in Equation 10
is achieved if the noise covariance matrix KZ has
the corner-wave pattern as shown in Equation 15.
Specifically, we say that an M ×M square matrix has
the corner-wave property if, for every i from 1 to M ,
the following entries have the same value as the (i, i)th
entry:
• all entries to the right of the (i, i)th entry in row
i,
• all entries below the (i, i)th entry in column i.
The distribution of the entries in such a matrix looks
like corner-waves originated from the lower right
corner.
Theorem 4: Let Y = [Y T1 , . . . , Y
T
M ]
T represent an
arbitrary number of perturbed copies. Assume that
Y is generated from the original data X as follows:
Y = HX + Z,
where H = [IN , . . . , IN ]
T
, and Z = [ZT1 , . . . , Z
T
M ]
T
with Zi ∼ N(0, σ
2
Zi
KX) is the noise vector. Without
loss of generality, we further assume
σ2Zi < σ
2
Zi+1 , ∀i = 1, . . . ,M − 1. (14)
Then the following equation holds
D(X, Xˆ(Y)) = min
i=1,...,M
D(X, Xˆ(Yi)) =
σ2Z1
σ2Z1 + 1
1
N
Tr(KX),
if Z is a jointly Gaussian vector and its covariance
matrix KZ is given by
KZ =


σ2Z1KX σ
2
Z1
KX · · · σ
2
Z1
KX
σ2Z1KX σ
2
Z2
KX · · · σ
2
Z2
KX
...
...
. . .
...
σ2Z1KX σ
2
Z2
KX · · · σ
2
ZM
KX

 .(15)
Proof: Refer to Appendix E.
Remark: The corner-wave property of KZ given in
Equation 15 guarantees that Equation 10 holds. There-
fore, the diversity attack does not help to improve the
estimation accuracy.
Moreover, for any subset of these M perturbed
copies, the covariance matrix of the corresponding
noise also has the corner-wave property, and thus the
privacy goal is achieved. We summarize this observa-
tion in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: If the privacy goal in Equation 10
is achieved with respect to M perturbed data
Y1, . . . , YM , then the goal is also achieved with respect
to any subset of {Y1, . . . , YM}.
Based on Theorem 4 and Corollary 1, one way to
achieve the privacy goal in Equation 10 is to ensure
that noise Z is a jointly Gaussian vector and follows
N(0,KZ) where KZ is given by Equation 15. We
consider two scenarios when generating noise Z and
the corresponding perturbed copies Y. We discuss
these two scenarios in the following two sections.
5.2 Batch Generation
In the first scenario, the data owner determines the
M trust levels a priori, and generates M perturbed
copies of the data in one batch. In this case, all trust
levels are predefined and σ2Z1 to σ
2
ZM
are given when
generating the noise. We refer to this scenario as the
batch generation.
We propose two batch algorithms. Algorithm 1
generates noise Z1 to ZM in parallel while Algorithm
2 sequentially.
5.2.1 Algorithm 1: Parallel Generation
Without loss of generality, we assume σ2Zi < σ
2
Zi+1
where 1 ≤ i ≤ M − 1. Algorithm 1 generates the
components of noise Z, i.e., Z1 to ZM , simultaneously
based on the following probability distribution func-
tion, for any real (N ·M)-dimension vector v,
fZ(v) =
1√
(2pi)M det(KZ)
e−
1
2
vTK−1
Z
v, (16)
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where KZ is given by Equation 15.
Algorithm 1 then constructs Y as HX +Z and out-
puts it. We refer to Algorithm 1 as parallel generation.
Algorithm 1 : Parallel Generation
1: // Input: X , KX , and σ
2
Z1
to σ2ZM
2: // Output: Y
3: Construct KZ with KX and σ
2
Z1
to σ2ZM , according
to Equation 15
4: Generate Z with KZ, according to Equation 16
5: Generate Y = HX + Z
6: Output Y
Algorithm 1 serves as a baseline algorithm for the
next two algorithms.
5.2.2 Algorithm 2: Sequential Generation
The large memory requirement of Algorithm 1 mo-
tivates us to seek for a memory efficient solution.
Instead of parallel generation, sequentially generating
noise Z1 to ZM , each of which a Gaussian vector of N
dimension. The validity of the alternative procedure
is based on the insight in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Consider Z = [ZT1 , . . . , Z
T
M ]
T where
Zi ∼ N(0,KZi) with KZi = σ
2
Zi
KX . Without loss of
generality, further assume
σ2Zi < σ
2
Zi+1 , ∀i = 1, . . . ,M − 1.
Then Z is a jointly Gaussian vector and KZ has
the form in Equation 15, if and only if Z1, and
(Zi − Zi−1), i = 2, ...,M are mutually independent.
Proof: Refer to Appendix F.
Based on Theorem 5, Algorithm 2 sequentially gen-
erates M independent noise Z1, and (Zi −Zi−1) for i
from 2 toM . Noise Zi is then simply (Zi−Zi−1)+Zi−1
for i from 2 to M . Finally Algorithms 2 generates
the perturbed copies Y1 to YM by adding the corre-
sponding noise. We refer to Algorithm 2 as sequential
generation.
Algorithm 2 : Sequential Generation
1: // Input: X , KX , and σ
2
Z1
to σ2ZM
2: // Output: Y1 to YM
3: Construct Z1 ∼ N(0, σ
2
Z1
KX)
4: Generate Y1 = X + Z1
5: Output Y1
6: for i from 2 to M do
7: Construct noise ξ ∼ N(0, (σ2Zi − σ
2
Zi−1
)KX)
8: Generate Yi = Yi−1 + ξ
9: Output Yi
10: end for
We now explain intuitively why the mutual inde-
pendence requirement for Z1, and (Zi − Zi−1) for i
from 2 to M is sufficient to achieve our privacy goal
in Equation 10.
We rewrite Yi as X + Z1 +
∑i
j=2(Zj − Zj−1). Since
X , Z1 and Zj − Zj−1 for j = 2, . . . ,M are mutually
independent, Yi, 2 ≤ i ≤ M are perturbed observa-
tions of Y1. Intuitively all information in them that are
useful for estimating X is inherited from Y1. As such,
given Y1, Yi, 2 ≤ i ≤ M provides no extra innovative
information to improve the estimation accuracy. Sim-
ilar analysis applies to any subset of Y1 to YM . Hence,
Equation 10 is satisfied. This intuition is similar to the
explanation for the case study in Section 4.
5.2.3 Disadvantages
The main disadvantage of the batch generation ap-
proach is that it requires a data owner to foresee all
possible trust levels a priori.
This obligatory requirement is not flexible and
sometimes impossible to meet. One such scenario for
the latter arises in our case study. After the data
owner already released a perturbed copy Y2, a new
request for a less distorted copy Y1 arrives. The
sequential generation algorithm cannot handle such
requests since the trust level of the new request is
lower than the existing one. In today’s ever changing
world, it is desirable to have technologies that adapt
to the dynamics of the society. In our problem setting,
generating new perturbed copies on-demand would
be a desirable feature.
5.3 On Demand Generation
As opposed to the batch generation, new perturbed
copies are introduced on demand in this second
scenario. Since the requests may be arbitrary, the
trust levels corresponding to the new copies would
be arbitrary as well. The new copies can be either
lower or higher than the existing trust levels. We refer
this scenario as on-demand generation. Achieving the
privacy goal in this scenario will give data owners
the maximum flexibility in providing MLT-PPDM ser-
vices.
We assume L(L < M) existing copies of Y1 to YL.
We also assume that the data owner, upon requests,
generates additionalM−L copies of YL+1 to YM . Thus
there will beM copies in total. Note in this subsection
σ2Z1 to σ
2
ZM
can be in any order. Finally, we define
vectors Z′ and Z′′ as
Z
′ =


Z1
...
ZL

 and Z′′ =


ZL+1
...
ZM

 .
According to Theorem 4, the data owner should
generate new noise Z′′ in such a way that the co-
variance matrix of Z = [Z′
T
Z′′
T
]T has corner-wave
property, and they are jointly Gaussian.
The desired covariance matrix KZ can be con-
structed according to Equation 15 (after properly or-
dering Z1 to ZM according to σ
2
Z1
to σ2ZM ).
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According to Section 2.1, it is sufficient and neces-
sary for the conditional distribution of Z′′ given that
Z′ takes any value v1 to be a Gaussian with mean
KZ′′Z′K
−1
Z′
v1 (17)
and covariance
KZ′′ −KZ′′Z′K
−1
Z′
KTZ′′Z′ , (18)
where KZ′ is the covariance matrix of Z
′, KZ′′Z′ is
the desired covariance matrix between Z′′ and Z′, and
KZ′′ is the desired covariance matrix of Z
′′.
Note KZ′ is known to the data owner, and KZ′′Z′
and KZ′′ can be extracted from the desired covariance
matrix KZ. We turn the above analysis into Algo-
rithm 3.
Algorithm 3 : On Demand Generation
1: // Input: X , KX , σ
2
Z1
to σ2ZM , and values of Z
′:
v1
2: // Output: New copies Z′′
3: Construct KZ with KX and σ
2
Z1
to σ2ZM , according
to Equation 15
4: Extract KZ′ , KZ′′Z′ , and KZ′′ from KZ
5: Generate Z′′ as a Gaussian with mean and vari-
ance in Equation 17 and 18, respectively
6: for i from L+ 1 to M do
7: Generate Yi = X + Zi
8: Output Yi
9: end for
5.4 Time and Space Complexity
In this subsection, we study the time and space
complexity of the three algorithms. One may notice
that all the covariance matrices of noise in the three
algorithms, such as Equation 15 and Equation 18, can
be written as the Kronecker product of two matrices.
For such covariance matrices, we have the following
observation:
Lemma 1: Assume that µ and K are the mean and
covariance matrix of the jointly Gaussian random
vector G. If KG = ΣG⊗K0, where ΣG andK0 are P×P
and Q × Q, respectively, and K0 is also a covariance
matrix, then the time complexity of generating G is
O(P 3 +Q3).
Proof: Refer to Appendix G.1.
Remark: Directly generating G using KG, the com-
plexity is O(P 3Q3). Viewing KG as a Kronecker prod-
uct of two matrices of smaller dimensions, we can
utilize the properties of Kronecker product to reduce
the complexity to O(P 3 +Q3).
The proof suggests an efficient implementation of
the proposed three algorithms. Note that for each al-
gorithm, the time complexity may be further reduced.
Utilizing Lemma 1, we give the following theorems
on the time and space complexity of the proposed
three algorithms.
Theorem 6: Given an N -dimensional data vector
X , the time complexity of generating M perturbed
copies using Algorithm 1 is O(N3 +MN2), and the
space complexity is O(M +N2).
Proof: Refer to Appendix G.2.
Theorem 7: Given an N -dimensional data vector
X , the time complexity of generating M perturbed
copies using Algorithm 2 is O(N3 +MN2), and the
space complexity is O(N2).
Proof: Refer to Appendix G.3.
Remark: Using a similar set of arguments, we can
show the time complexity of the independent noise
scheme described in Section 5.1.1 is the same as
Algorithm 2.
Theorem 8: Given an N -dimensional data vector
X and L (1 ≤ L ≤ M − 1) perturbed copies of X ,
the time complexity of generating (M −L) perturbed
copies using Algorithm 3 is O(M3+N3), and the space
complexity is O(M2 +N2).
Proof: Refer to Appendix G.4.
Table 2 compares the applicabilities and complexity
of the three proposed algorithms. In summary, Algo-
rithms 1 and 2 have less space and time complexity
than Algorithm 3; Algorithm 3 offers data owners
maximum flexibility by generating perturbed copies
in an on-demand fashion.
6 EXPERIMENTS
6.1 Methodology and Settings
We design two experiments, performance test (Exper-
iment 1) and scalability test (Experiment 2). Experi-
ment 1 explores answers to the following questions
numerically:
• How severe can LLSE-based diversity attacks be,
given that the perturbed copies at different trust
levels are generated independently?
• How effective is our proposed scheme against
LLSE-based diversity attacks, compared to the
above independent noise scheme?
• How does an adversary’s knowledge affect the
power of such attacks?
Experiment 2 demonstrates the runtime of our pro-
posed Algorithm 3.
We run our experiments on a real dataset CENSUS
[41], which is commonly used in the literature of
privacy preservation such as [42], for carrying out
the experiments and evaluating their performance in
a fully controlled manner. This dataset contains one
million tuples with four attributes: Age, Education,
Occupation, and Income. We take the first 105 tuples
and conduct the experiments on the Age and Income
attributes. The statistics and distribution of the data
are shown in Table 3 and Figure 1, respectively.
Given data X (Age and Income), to generate per-
turbed copies Yi at different trust levels i, we generate
Gaussian noise Zi according to N(0, σ
2
Zi
KX), and add
Zi to X . The constant σ
2
Zi
represents the perturbation
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TABLE 2
Comparison of applicabilities, space complexity, and time complexity of three proposed algorithms.
Batch On-demand Space Time
Generation Generation Complexity Complexity
Algorithm 1 X O(M +N2) O(N3 +MN2)
Algorithm 2 X O(N2) O(N3 +MN2)
Algorithm 3 X X O(M2 +N2) O(M3 +N3)
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Fig. 1. Distribution of sensitive values Age and Income.
magnitude determined by the data owner according
to the trust level i. The noise for different trust levels
are generated either independently, or in a properly
correlated manner following our proposed solution in
Section 5.
Data miners can access one or more perturbed
copies Yi, either according to application scenario
setting or by collusion among themselves. Recall our
assumption that data miners perform joint LLSE esti-
mation to reconstruct X . We study two classes of data
miners with different knowledge about the original
data and noise:
• the first class of adversaries has perfect knowl-
edge, i.e., the exact values of µX , KX and σ
2
Zi
for
every trust level i;
• the second class of adversaries has partial knowl-
edge, i.e., the exact values of σ2Zi for every trust
level i, but not µX and KX .
To perform LLSE estimation, data miners with
partial knowledge estimate µX and KX using their
perturbed copies. For each Yi, its mean is simply µX ,
and its covariance matrix is (1+σ2Zi )KX . Knowing the
exact values of σ2Zi , a data miner can estimate µX and
KX using the sample mean and sample covariance
matrix of Yi. Accuracy of such estimation depends on
the sample size; the larger the sample size, the more
accurate the estimation of µX and KX .
TABLE 3
Statistics of the original data Age and Income.
Mean µX Variance σ
2
X
Age 50.06 303.03
Income 16.57 219.92
In Experiment 1, we use two performance metrics,
average normalized estimation error and distribution
of estimation error. For LLSE estimate of X based
on Y, i.e., Xˆ(Y), we define its normalized estimation
error as
D(X, Xˆ(Y))
Tr(KX)
.
It takes values between 0 and 1. The smaller it is,
the more accurate the LLSE estimation is. It generally
decreases as more perturbed copies are used in the
LLSE estimation. When showing the distribution of
the estimation error, we use
√
D(X, Xˆ(Y)) directly,
and one may see how large the distortion is, compared
to the values of the original data shown in Fig. 1, as
we do not normalize it. The distribution is represented
by a histogram as well as a cumulative histogram.
The curve of cumulative histogram starts from 0 and
increases to 1. The faster the curve approaches 1,
i.e., the bigger proportion of accurate estimates, the
better the LLSE-based diversity attack performs. We
conduct experiments on data with two attributes (i.e.,
N = 2); however, for ease of illustration, we show the
performance on different attributes separately.
6.2 Experiment 1: Performance Test
In this subsection, we show the superiority of our
scheme over the scheme that simply adds indepen-
dent noise, and how data miner’s knowledge affects
the power of LLSE-based diversity attacks. Algorithm
3 is used for the experiment due to its maximum
flexibility among the three proposed algorithms.
M perturbed copies Yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M , are generated
one by one upon requests, adding independent noise
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Fig. 2. Comparisons of average normalized estimation error of the independent noise scheme (denoted as IN)
and our scheme (denoted as Ours) on the data Age (a) and Income (b), respectively. The average normalized
estimation error of each setting is shown as a function of the number of generated perturbed copies. Note that
using our algorithm, the curve of attacks utilizing the least perturbed copy overlaps with the curve of attacks
utilizing all the available M copies. Perturbation magnitude σ2Zi is shown as a function of perturbed copy number
i at the bottom.
to the original data or using our proposed Algorithm
3. Each request is at a different trust level with corre-
sponding σ2Zi randomly generated in [0.25, 1]. Figure 2
shows σ2Zi as a function of perturbed copy number i.
We assume that data miners can access all the M
perturbed copies. This setting represents the most
severe attack scenario where data miners jointly es-
timate X using all the available M perturbed copies.
Since the perturbed copies are released one by one,
the number of the available perturbed copies also
increases one by one.
We also assume that data miners with partial
knowledge estimate µX andKX with different sample
sizes. In particular, we assume that they have 100N2,
200N2 and 300N2 samples, where N2 is the number
of entries in KX and N = 2 in our experiments.
Figures 2(a) and (b) show the normalized estimation
errors of both schemes as a function of the number
of perturbed copies, on attributes Age and Income,
respectively.
The results of the experiments clearly show that the
diversity gain in joint estimation reduces the normal-
ized estimation error dramatically. While for our al-
gorithm, we find that the estimation error drops only
when a perturbed copy with minimum perturbation
magnitude so far becomes available. Using our algo-
rithm, the curve of attacks utilizing the least perturbed
copy overlaps with the curve of attacks utilizing all
the availableM copies. The above observations imply
that the joint estimation based on all existing copies is
only as good as the estimation based on the copy with
the minimum privacy, and there is no diversity gain
in performing the LLSE estimation jointly. Moreover,
we have verified that the estimation error matches our
analytical result in Theorem 4.
We also find that when data miners have perfect
knowledge, the normalized estimation error decreases
monotonically as M increases for copies perturbed
by independent noise. This trend indicates a perfect
reconstruction of X when M goes to infinity. It also
confirms Theorem 3 empirically.
On the other hand, if the adversaries have to es-
timate µX and KX from samples, i.e., the attackers
have partial knowledge, the curve flattens and even
slightly increases asM becomes large. This is because
the estimation error depends not only on the number
of perturbed copies, but also on the precision of
µX and KX . The estimation based on inaccurately
estimated mX and KX is not optimal. Consequently,
the estimation accuracy does not always improve as
M increases. Figure 2 also shows that adversaries
having more samples perform better in estimating µX
and KX , resulting in improved overall accuracy.
Figures 3(a) and (b) show the corresponding his-
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Fig. 3. The corresponding histogram and cumulative histogram of the estimation error when M = 5, 10, 20 and
30, respectively, using the two different schemes.
tograms and cumulative histograms of the estimation
errors for M = 5, 10, 20 and 30, using the our
proposed scheme and the independent noise scheme.
The cumulative histograms of our scheme approaches
1 much slower than those of the independent noise
scheme. This indicates that the adversaries obtain less
accurate estimations from copies generated by our
scheme than from those generated by the independent
noise scheme. We also observe that as M increases,
the cumulative histograms of our scheme are almost
identical as expected; while those by the independent
noise scheme approaches the vertical axis, implying
estimation errors decrease as adversaries obtain more
independently perturbed copies.
In summary, the privacy goal in Section 3.4 is
achieved in this most severe attacking scenario.
We further verify that the perturbed copy by our
scheme has the same utility as that by the indepen-
dent noise scheme, if their trust levels are the same.
We use the Iris Plant and Wisconsin Diagnostic Breast
Cancer databases from the UCI Machine Learning
Repository for the experiment. We measure the utili-
ties with a decision tree classifier and a SVM classifier
with radial basis kernel. The average accuracies over
10-fold cross validation are reported in Fig. 4. As
seen from Fig. 4, at all noise levels, the accuracies by
the same classifier on the data perturbed by adding
independent noise and by properly adding correlated
noise following our scheme are identical. Therefore,
the perturbed copies at the same trust level by differ-
ent noise addition techniques have the same utilities.
6.3 Experiment 2: Scalability Test
The scalability test is conducted in MATLAB v7.6
on a PC with 2.5GHz CPU and 2GB memory. The
attribute Income is used as the original data. We only
test Algorithm 3 as it offers the maximum flexibil-
ity in generating perturbed copies and it has the
highest time complexity among our three proposed
algorithms. We use the independent noise scheme
with the same settings as a baseline algorithm. Note
that this scheme, although with less runtime, is not
resistent to diversity attacks.
Theorem 8 states that to generate one tuple, the
time complexity is O(M3+N3). To generate T tuples
together, some of the computation can be shared, e.g.,
generating the covariance matrix of Z′′. As a result,
the total time complexity to generate T perturbed tu-
ples is O(M3+N3+T (M2N+MN2)), and the average
time complexity for one tuple is O(M2N +MN2) for
large T .
Figure 5 shows the runtime of Algorithm 3 as
a function of the total number of perturbed copies
M . For each value of M , the data owner generates
M − L perturbed copies each of 105 tuples. We set
L = ⌊M/4⌋, ⌊M/2⌋, and ⌊3M/4⌋ respectively. Our ob-
servations are three-folded. First, our algorithm is fast.
For example, generating 23 perturbed copies (M = 30,
L = ⌊M/4⌋ = 7) only takes 0.37 seconds. Second,
the actual runtime of Algorithm 3 we observe only
increases approximately linearly in M . This observed
complexity is much smaller than the theoretical upper
bound O(M3 + N3 + M2N + MN2) we estimated
in Section 5.4. Third, the runtime difference between
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Fig. 4. Comparison of utilities of perturbed copies by different noise addition techniques. We show the
classification accuracy on the perturbed data at M = 20 different noise levels. The Iris Plant database has
150 tuples with four numerical attributes, and contains three classes of 50 tuples each. The Wisconsin Diagnostic
Breast Cancer database has 699 tuples with nine numerical attributes, and contains two classes.
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Fig. 5. The runtime as a function of the total number
of perturbed copies M , when the data owner generates
M−L perturbed copies each of 105 tuples. The runtime
is averaged on 100 repeated tests.
Algorithm 3 and the independent noise scheme is
considerably small. The time complexity of Algorithm
3 is the same as that of generating jointly Gaussian
noise given the mean and covariance. One of the rea-
sons why the independent noise scheme is marginally
faster is that it uses an all-zero mean vector and
diagonal covariance matrix.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we expand the scope of additive per-
turbation based PPDM to multi-level trust (MLT), by
relaxing an implicit assumption of single-level trust
in exiting work. MLT-PPDM allows data owners to
generate differently perturbed copies of its data for
different trust levels.
The key challenge lies in preventing the data miners
from combining copies at different trust levels to
jointly reconstruct the original data more accurate
than what is allowed by the data owner.
We address this challenge by properly correlating
noise across copies at different trust levels. We prove
that if we design the noise covariance matrix to have
corner-wave property, then data miners will have
no diversity gain in their joint reconstruction of the
original data. We verify our claim and demonstrate
the effectiveness of our solution through numerical
evaluation.
Last but not the least, our solution allows data
owners to generate perturbed copies of its data at
arbitrary trust levels on-demand. This property offers
the data owner maximum flexibility.
We believe that multi-level trust privacy preserving
data mining can find many applications. Our work
takes the initial step to enable MLT-PPDM services.
Many interesting and important directions are
worth exploring. For example, it is not clear how to
expand the scope of other approaches in the area of
partial information hiding, such as random rotation
based data perturbation, k-anonymity, and retention
replacement, to multi-level trust. It is also of great
interest to extend our approach to handle evolving
data streams.
As with most existing work on perturbation based
PPDM, our work is limited in the sense that it con-
siders only linear attacks. More powerful adversaries
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may apply nonlinear techniques to derive original
data and recover more information. Studying the
MLT-PPDM problem under this adversarial model is
an interesting future direction.
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APPENDIX A
DEDUCTION OF EQUATION 4
Assume that the LLSE estimate Xˆ(Y ) = AY + b,
where A and b are parameters. LLSE minimizes the
square errors between the estimated data Xˆ(Y ) and
the original data X , i.e.,
J = 12E{Tr[(X − Xˆ(Y ))(X − Xˆ(Y ))
T ]}
= 12E{Tr[(X −AY − b)(X −AY − b)
T ]}.
As J is a quadratic function of A and b, the optimal
values of A and b satisfy that
∂J
∂A = −E[(X − Xˆ(Y ))Y
T ] = 0,
∂J
∂b = −E[X − Xˆ(Y )] = 0.
The above equations are called the orthogonality prin-
ciple, from which
A = KXYK
−1
Y ,
b = E[X ]−KXYK
−1
Y E[Y ].
Thus, we have
Xˆ(Y ) = KXYK
−1
Y [Y − E[Y ]] + E[X ],
where E[X ] = E[Y ] = µX .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first prove the if part of the theorem. From
the covariance matrix of Z1 and Z2, we know that
E[Z1Z2] = σ
2
1σ
2
X . Therefore,
E[Z1(Z2−Z1)] = E[Z1Z2]−E[Z
2
1 ] = σ
2
1σ
2
X−σ
2
1σ
2
X = 0,
(19)
suggesting that Z1 and Z2 − Z1 are linearly indepen-
dent.
Meanwhile, by definition of jointly Gaussian, Z2 −
Z1 is also a Gaussian random variable. For Gaussian
variables Z1 and Z2−Z1, linear independence implies
independence.
We now prove the only if part of the theorem. We
observe that Z2 = Z1 + (Z2 − Z1) is sum of two
independent Gaussian random variables. Thus, Z2
and Z1 are jointly Gaussian by definition, and we also
have E[Z2Z1] = E[Z1Z2] = σ
2
1σ
2
X . It follows that their
covariance matrix is as follows:[
σ21σ
2
X σ
2
1σ
2
X
σ21σ
2
X σ
2
2σ
2
X
]
.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
By Theorem 5, if Z1 and Z2 satisfy that Z1 and
Z2−Z1 are independent, then their covariance matrix,
denoted by KC , must be given by
KC =
[
σ21σ
2
X σ
2
1σ
2
X
σ21σ
2
X σ
2
2σ
2
X
]
.
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Based on Y1, the LLSE estimation of X has an
estimation error of
σ2X −
σ2X
1 + σ21
=
σ2X
1 + 1/σ21
, (20)
which can be computed using Equation 8.
Similarly, based on both Y1 and Y2, the LLSE esti-
mation of X has an estimation error of[
1
σ2X
+
[
1 1
]
K−1C
[
1
1
]]−1
.
After simplification, the above estimation error is ex-
actly the one shown in Equation 20. Thus, Equation 11
holds.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
If Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M are independent to each other, then
KZ is given by
KZ =


σ2Z1KX 0 · · · 0
0 σ2Z2KX · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · σ2ZMKX

 .
By Equation 7, the estimation errors are the diagonal
terms of the following matrix
[
K−1X +H
TK−1
Z
H
]−1
=
(
1 +
M∑
i=1
1
σ2Zi
)−1
KX .
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
By the definition of distortion and the result shown
in Equation 7, we have
D(X, Xˆ(Y)) =
1
N
Tr
([
K−1X +H
TK−1
Z
H
]−1)
,
and for i = 1, . . . ,M ,
D(X, Xˆ(Yi)) =
σ2Zi
1 + σ2Zi
1
N
Tr (KX) .
Two observations can be made for the above
two equations. First, we must have D(X, Xˆ(Yi)) <
D(X, Xˆ(Yi+1)) due to the assumption on σZi in Equa-
tion 14, and
min
i=1,...,M
D(X, Xˆ(Yi)) = D(X, Xˆ(Y1)) =
σ2Z1
σ2Z1 + 1
Tr(KX)
N
.
Second, the proof is complete if we can show that
HTK−1
Z
H = K−1Z1 . (21)
This obviously holds for the case of M = 1.
Rewrite KZ as the following form
KZ =


KZ1 KZ1 · · · KZ1
KZ1
σ2
Z2
σ2
Z1
KZ1 · · ·
σ2
Z2
σ2
Z1
KZ1
...
...
. . .
...
KZ1
σ2
Z2
σ2
Z1
KZ1 · · ·
σ2
ZM
σ2
Z1
KZ1


.
We find its inverse following a standard process. We
perform row operation to the matrix [KZ | I] until
it has the form [I | A]. Then matrix A is K−1
Z
.
Note the structure of KZ makes this process pretty
straightforward and easy.
Following above process, we find the expression of
K−1
Z
for the case of M ≥ 2 as follows:


c1σ
2
Z2
σ2
Z1
K
−1
Z1
−c1K
−1
Z1
0 · · · 0
−c1K
−1
Z1
(c1 + c2)K
−1
Z1
−c2K
−1
Z1
· · · 0
0 −c2K
−1
Z1
(c2 + c3)K
−1
Z1
· · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · cM−1K
−1
Z1


,
(22)
where
ci =
1
σ2Zi+1/σ
2
Z1
− σ2Zi/σ
2
Z1
, 1 ≤ i ≤M − 1.
It is straightforward to verify the product of KZ and
the above matrix is an identity matrix.
Noticing that K−1
Z
only have non-zero entries in the
main diagonal and two adjacent diagonals, and that
its column and row sums are zero except the first row
and column, we have
HTK−1
Z
H =
[
K−1Z1 0 · · · 0
]
IN
...
IN

 = K−1Z1 ,
and the proof is complete.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We first prove the if part of the theorem. Since Z1 to
ZM are jointly Gaussian variables, Z1, and (Zi−Zi−1)
for are also jointly Gaussian variables. This is because
any linear combination of them is simply another
linear combination of Z1 to ZM , and is thus a Gaus-
sian. For jointly Gaussian variables, they are mutually
independent if their covariance matrix is a diagonal
matrix. This can be easily verified by evaluating their
joint distribution.
From the covariance matrix of Z, we know that for
j > i, E[ZiZ
T
j ] = KZi . For 2 ≤ i < j ≤M , we have
E[(Zi − Zi−1)(Zj − Zj−1)
T ]
= E[ZiZ
T
j ]− E[ZiZ
T
j−1]− E[Zi−1Z
T
j ] + E[Zi−1Z
T
j−1]
= KZi −KZi −KZi−1 +KZi−1 = 0.
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We also have for 2 ≤ i ≤M ,
E[Z1(Zi − Zi−1)
T ] = E[Z1Z
T
i ]− E[Z1Zi−1]
T
= KZ1 −KZ1 = 0.
As such, we must have the covariance matrix of Z1,
and (Zi − Zi−1) for to be diagonal, and they are
mutually independent.
We now prove the only if part of the theorem. Since
Z1, and (Zi − Zi−1) for i from 2 to M are mutually
independent Gaussian variables, we must have Z1 to
ZM to be jointly Gaussian. This is because each of
them is simply a linear combination of independent
Gaussian variables.
We also have for j > i,
E[ZiZ
T
j ] = E

Zi
(
Zi +
j∑
l=i+1
(Zl − Zl−1)
)T
= E[ZiZ
T
i ] +
j∑
l=i+1
E[Zi(Zl − Zl−1)
T ]
= KZi .
It follows that KZ must have the form as in Equa-
tion 15.
APPENDIX G
TIME AND SPACE COMPLEXITY
For ease of discussion, we summarize the time com-
plexity of several basic operations as follows:
• Multiplication of two matrices: the complexity
of multiplication of an P1×P2 matrix and an P2×
P3 matrix is O(P1P2P3) by direct computation.
• Cholesky decomposition of P×P matrices: time
complexity is O(P 3) [43, pp. 245].
G.1 Proof of Lemma 1
To generate jointly Gaussian random vector G, the
standard routine [44] generates independent zero-
mean unit-variance Gaussian vector G and then uses
a linear transformation
G = µG + LGN, (23)
whereKG = LGL
T
G
is the Cholesky decomposition [43,
pp. 245] of KG.
If both ΣG and K0 are positive semi-definite, we can
perform the Cholesky decomposition as ΣG = LΣL
T
Σ
and K0 = L0L
T
0 , and then
KG = (LΣL
T
Σ)⊗ (L0L
T
0 ) = (LΣ ⊗ L0)(LΣ ⊗ L0)
T .
Thus the Cholesky decomposition of KG can be ex-
pressed s LG = LΣ ⊗ L0.
Following that, Equation 23 can be written as
G = µG + (LΣ ⊗ L0)G = µG + vec(L0NQ×PL
T
Σ), (24)
where NQ×P is a Q × P matrix satisfying that
vec(NQ×P ) = N.
The total time complexity is the sum of the com-
plexity of generating PQ independent zero-mean
unit-variance Gaussian random variables3 O(PQ), the
Cholesky decomposition O(P 3+Q3), the matrix mul-
tiplication O(Q2P + P 2Q), and the vector addition
O(PQ),4 i.e., O(P 3 +Q3).
To complete the proof, the remaining part of the
proof shows that ΣG is positive semi-definite given
that KG and K0 are covariance matrices and KG =
ΣG ⊗K0.
The definition of positive semi-definite matrices
suggests that FTKGF ≥ 0 for an arbitrary column
vector F . Without loss of generality, we assume that
the elementK0(1, 1) in the top-left corner ofK0 is pos-
itive. Then we let F1 be composed of all the (iQ+1)-
th (i = 0, ..., P − 1) elements of F and let the other
elements of F be zero, and thus FT1 (K0(1, 1)ΣG)F1 =
FTKGF ≥ 0. It is straightforward that ΣG is positive
semi-definite as FT1 ΣGF1 ≥ 0 for any F1.
G.2 Proof of Theorem 6
With the technique in the proof of Lemma 1, generat-
ing MN -dimensional jointly Gaussian noise vector Z
can use Equation 24.
In Algorithm 1, the covariance matrix of Z is KZ =
ΣZ ⊗KX , where
ΣZ =


σ21 σ
2
1 · · · σ
2
1
σ21 σ
2
2 · · · σ
2
2
...
...
. . .
...
σ21 σ
2
2 · · · σ
2
M

 .
It is easy to verify that for the Cholesky decomposi-
tion ΣZ = LΣL
T
Σ,
LΣ = Udiag(Vσ),
where U is the lower triangular part (including
the diagonal) of all-one M × M matrix, Vσ =
[σ1,
√
σ22 − σ
2
1 , ...,
√
σ2M − σ
2
M−1], and diag(Vσ) is a di-
agonal matrix with the vector Vσ as its diagonal.
Thus Equation 24 can be written as
Z = µZ + vec(LX(GN×Mdiag(Vσ))U
T ), (25)
The matrix multiplication in Equation 25 can be
split into three steps, as shown with the brackets, with
a time complexity O(MN), O(MN), and O(N2M),
respectively.
As a result, Algorithm 1 has a time complexity of
O(N3 +MN2).
The space complexity is O(M +N2), as Algorithm
1 has to store the noise levels σ21 , ..., σ
2
M and the
covariance matrix KX .
3. PQ independent zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random
variables can be generated using a standard algorithm, e.g., [45].
4. Since the time complexity of generate PQ independent zero-
mean unit-variance Gaussian random variables and the vector ad-
dition are both O(PQ), which can be bounded by O(P 2Q+PQ2),
we omit the complexity of them in the proof of Theorems 6–8.
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G.3 Proof of Theorem 7
According to Lemma 1, when generating one per-
turbed copy of X , the Cholesky decomposition of KX
has a time complexity of O(N3), and the rest part costs
O(N2). As the Cholesky decomposition of KX can be
reused for different copies, generating M perturbed
copies of X only has a time complexity O(N3+MN2).
Algorithm 2 only requires a memory of size O(N2)
for the covariance matrix KX , as the noise levels σ
2
i
(i = 1, ...,M ) are input sequentially.
G.4 Proof of Theorem 8
Algorithm 3 first constructs the (MN)× (MN) matrix
KZ in O(MN) time. It then computes a mean and
variance according to Equations 17 and 18.
Note that Equations 17 and 18 can be written as
[(ΣZ′′Z′Σ
−1
Z′
)⊗IN ]v1 and (ΣZ′′−ΣZ′′Z′Σ
−1
Z′
ΣT
Z′′Z′
)⊗KX ,
respectively, where KZ′′ = ΣZ′′⊗KX , KZ′ = ΣZ′⊗KX
and KZ′′Z′ = ΣZ′′Z′ ⊗KX . Σ
−1
Z′
has been given in an
explicit form in Equation 22. So the time complexity
of computing the mean and the Kronecker product
form of the covariance matrix are O((M−L)L2+(M−
L)LN) and O((M − L)L2 + (M − L)2L), respectively.
At the end, Algorithm 3 generates (M − L) jointly
Gaussian variables with the computed mean and
covariance matrix, and outputs (M − L) perturbed
copies. According to Lemma 1, the time complexity
is O((M − L)3 +N3 + (M − L)2N + (M − L)N2).
For any value of L, the time complexity of Algo-
rithm 3 is bounded by O(M3 +N3 +M2N +MN2),
which can be further simplified to O(M3 +N3).
For Algorithm 3, it requires O(M2 + N2) memory
to store the covariance matrix KZ.
